Safety Culture Transformation: A Success Story by Peterson, Tom, MD, FAAP, Executive Director of Safety, Quality Community Health
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children's hospital 
a member of SPECTRUM HEALTH 
In 2009, We Passed the 10 Year 
Anniversary of the 10M Report-
"To Err is Human" 
Are Hospitals Safer in 2011? 
c.;c,nsid,;rable efforts have been '11ade to I 
patient safety and it is natural to ; 
ask... are oatients any safer? The answer: 
this Simple question is curiously I 
.. we beiieve that the lack of I 
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children's hospital 
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Most U.S. hospitals still have a long way to go before they me.teven 
minimum safety and quality standards, according to the 2008 Leapfrog Hosplta! 
Survey Results report 
"Health care for so long has operated           a curtain," she said 
"We haven't fully understooctthe level ofqual·ty thatwe're deahngWlth. 
indeed,Laurel Pickering, executive director of the New York BusinessGroup on 
Health, said none of the 50 members of her coalition are using 
                  data in their negotiationswith insurers and health care 
orgamzat!ons" 
By contrast, insurers do use the leapfrog report, along wrth their 
own claims data, to determine which                         include!n their 
providernetworks, according to an industry spoKesman. 
13.5% (lout of every 7) of hospitalized Medicare patients 
suffer an adverse event 
15,000 patients die per month due to medica: mistakes 
44% 0' all events rendered as preventable 
Annuai costs equate to $3 8 billion In Medicare alone 
25.1 per 100 admitted patients harmed by adverse drug events 
Deoartrnent ofHHS, Nov 2010 
Land:--gan e: aI, New Eng ";O".l! Merl. NOli, 2010 
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Expectations 
Accountability 
Level playing field 
(authonty g 'adient) 
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Metncs 
Transparency 
Physician leadership 
Executive support 
Situational awareness 
High reliability principles 
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Prevention 
High reliability characteristics apply to both 
Rely on basically the same principles 
Detection 
Improving safety improves quality, and vice versa Correction 
Sustainmen t 
Prevention Leamed Behaviors 
Pay attention to detail 
Support the Team 
Questioning attitude 
Clear communicatirn 
Clear the air 
Lessen the authOrity gradient 
Limit intimidatioo 
Safe environment for reporting 
Full transparency 
Detection 
Develop metrics 
SSER 
Days since lasl event 
Days between events 
Lagging, realtime 
Develop a standardized classification 
SSE, PCE NME ADEll 000 
Effective reporting 
Efficient and supported inCident reporting 
Adverse orug events in real tjl11e 
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Senous SafetyEvent 
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ha"           i!r( !(>l'tI (>,,)'y h. I(The SSER is calculated                   as the number of Serious Safety Events         the 
previous 12 months per 10,000 adrusted patient days for the same tnne period 
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Flowchart & Guide 
Notice Uiat it avoids the causatjon questiOn 
Near Miss 
Event that almost happened· the 
error was caught by one last detection 
barrier 
CauseAnaiysisLevei Trend, ACA 
Learn the Science 
Human and System Failure mode methodologies 
Taxonomies 
Error types 
Root Cause/Common Cause analysis 
Expand RCA expertise to Units 
Real time reporting and determination 
Full integration with Risk Management 
Work as a team 
Classify all events in a database 
Share transparentiy and frequently 
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Actullllncrea5(1 due to complacency 
or reverting to ojd habit. 
Long-term Improvement 
through .ustalned prevention 
Time 
Implementing High Reliability Principles 
"Together these processes produce a collective 
state of mindfulness. To be mindful is to have 
an enhanced ability to discover and correct 
errors that could escalate into a crisis." 
Early Adopters Loose the Gains 
Case A - Sing:e Hosp,ta Case B - Muft(-Hospital Syslem 
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A strong safety foundatlon and culture 
A safety infrastructure 
Real, and actionable metrics 
Full transparency 
Physician and administrative leadership 
Risk manageme nt as part of the team 
Value driven uniis 
Reluctance to simplify 
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Preoccupation with failure 
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Deference to expertise 
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Sensitivity to operations 
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Situatlol1a! awareness 
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Commitment to resilience Time 
DI. Slave Muethn1g. M;) COiMC 
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Not Yet! 
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Are we an HRO Yet? • 
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Increase physician leadership  
Safety coaches  
TeamfHRU leaders  
Lead by e'Xample  
Conttnuousenforcementand support of behaviors 
They then ail become habits 
Start early 
Nursmg and medica! students, interprofessional approach 
Residents 
Staff Orientation 
Keep safety as a priority 
Regardless 01 staff changes, revenue crunches, or new leadership 
Staron!,l meetings. Saf.ery Stofles 
Always reporting events, or non-events 
CO"lstant aood eaten reporting 
Drive toward high reliability units 
Nurse-Physician Co-leadership 
Unit level outcomes 
Unit level Innovation and improvem ent 
Learning system across microsystems 
Locus of Prioritization of goals 
High Reliability Unit pilot 
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